Serial Vickrey Mechanism

ISER DP No. 1095, July 2020

55 Pages Posted: 17 Sep 2020

See all articles by Yu Zhou

Yu Zhou

affiliation not provided to SSRN; Graduate School of Economics, Kyoto University

Shigehiro Serizawa

Osaka University - Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)

Date Written: July 30, 2020

Abstract

We study an assignment market where multiple heterogenous objects are sold to unit demand agents who have general preferences accommodating imperfect transferability of utility and income effects. In such a model, there is a minimum price equilibrium. We establish the structural characterizations of minimum price equilibria and employ these results to design the "Serial Vickrey mechanism," that finds a minimum price equilibrium in a finite number of steps. The Serial Vickrey mechanism introduces the objects one by one, and requires agents to report finite-dimensional prices in finitely many times. Besides, the Serial Vickrey mechanism also has nice dynamic incentive properties.

Keywords: the assignment market, minimum price equilibrium, general preferences, structural characterizations, Serial Vickrey mechanism, dynamic incentive compatibility

JEL Classification: C63, C70, D44

Suggested Citation

Zhou, Yu and Zhou, Yu and Serizawa, Shigehiro, Serial Vickrey Mechanism (July 30, 2020). ISER DP No. 1095, July 2020, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3667371 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3667371

Yu Zhou

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Graduate School of Economics, Kyoto University ( email )

Yoshida-Honmachi, Sakyo-ku, Kyoto
Kyoto, 606-8501
Japan

Shigehiro Serizawa (Contact Author)

Osaka University - Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER) ( email )

6-1 Mihogaoka
Ibaraki, Osaka 567-0047
Japan
+81 6 6879 8558 (Phone)
+81 6 6878 2766 (Fax)

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