Marginal Benefits of the Core Securities Laws

7 J. Fin. Reg. 254 (2021)

30 Pages Posted: 18 Sep 2020 Last revised: 31 May 2022

Date Written: August 5, 2020

Abstract

To every thing there is a season. In the area of securities regulation in the United States, it is the season for expansion. This Article shows why such expansion should not involve use of the core issuer disclosure, fraud, and insider trading laws to reduce information asymmetry in the stock market in the name of investor protection. Any expansion of these laws focused on this secondary market, I argue, should therefore be justified by distinct concerns (namely, efficiency ones). Moreover, any push to better serve and protect investors should be focused on other areas of securities law (such as those relating to the structure of securities markets) or other markets (such as the market for investment management).

Keywords: Securities Regulation, Securities Law, Mandatory Disclosure, Securities Fraud, Insider Trading

Suggested Citation

Haeberle, Kevin S., Marginal Benefits of the Core Securities Laws (August 5, 2020). 7 J. Fin. Reg. 254 (2021), Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3667963 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3667963

Kevin S. Haeberle (Contact Author)

William & Mary Law School ( email )

PO Box 8795
William and Mary Law School
Williamsburg, VA 23187
United States

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