Choice of Law in Latin American Arbitration: Some Empirical Evidence and Reflections on the Latin American Market for Contracts

University of Luxembourg Law Working Paper No. 2020-017

Forthcoming, (77) THĒMIS-Revista de Derecho 2020

25 Pages Posted: 29 Sep 2020

See all articles by Gilles Cuniberti

Gilles Cuniberti

University of Luxembourg; Universite du Luxembourg - Faculty of Law, Economics and Finance

Manuel José Segovia González

European University Institute - Department of Law (LAW)

Date Written: July 8, 2020

Abstract

The aim of this Article is to assess the preferences of parties to Latin American international business transactions when they choose the law governing their contracts. For that purpose, we have conducted an empirical analysis of data that we were able to gather from arbitral institutions active in Latin America, with a focus on years 2011 and 2012. We then offer some reflections on the results and assess whether they can be explained by the territorial approach of choice of law in Latin America, the importance of the United States as a trading partner for Latin American countries and the extent to which Anglo-American lawyers are present on Latin American markets.

Suggested Citation

Cuniberti, Gilles and Cuniberti, Gilles and Segovia González, Manuel José, Choice of Law in Latin American Arbitration: Some Empirical Evidence and Reflections on the Latin American Market for Contracts (July 8, 2020). University of Luxembourg Law Working Paper No. 2020-017, Forthcoming, (77) THĒMIS-Revista de Derecho 2020, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3668867 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3668867

Gilles Cuniberti (Contact Author)

University of Luxembourg ( email )

Faculté de Droit
4, rue Alphonse Weicker
Luxembourg, 2721
Luxembourg

Universite du Luxembourg - Faculty of Law, Economics and Finance ( email )

4 rue Alphonse Weicker
Luxembourg, L-2721
Luxembourg

Manuel José Segovia González

European University Institute - Department of Law (LAW) ( email )

Via Bolognese 156 (Villa Salviati)
50-139 Firenze
ITALY

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