Development Status and Decision-Making in Investment Treaty Arbitration

Posted: 22 Sep 2020

See all articles by Weijia Rao

Weijia Rao

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty

Date Written: August 1, 2019

Abstract

In this paper, I reproduce, replicate and extend two representative empirical studies that examine biases against developing states in investment treaty arbitration and arrive at contradictory conclusions. I find no evidence of biases against developing states using the same datasets and estimation strategies as the original studies. I find similar results when using alternative estimation strategies in the replication. However, when I change to a larger and more up-to-date data set in the extension, I start to find consistent negative correlations between respondent states’ development status and their likelihood of losing. The results remain robust after I take into account confounding factors that could be correlated with unobserved case strength, and use the Heckman probit selection model to correct for potential selection bias caused by settlement. The patterns indicate that there may exist biases against developing states in investment treaty arbitration.

Suggested Citation

Rao, Weijia, Development Status and Decision-Making in Investment Treaty Arbitration (August 1, 2019). International Review of Law and Economics, Vol. 59, 2019, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3669380

Weijia Rao (Contact Author)

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty ( email )

3301 Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22201
United States

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
94
PlumX Metrics