CEO Outside Directorships and Managerial Efficiency: The Role of Host Board Capital
Corporate Governance: An International Review, Forthcoming
Posted: 23 Sep 2020
Date Written: July 2020
Abstract
We explore the value of CEO outside directorships on managerial efficiency by identifying a unique empirical setting where a CEO’s number of outside board seats is exogenously decreased by a merger that eliminates the board of a host firm the CEO is serving on. Using this event as our empirical instrument, we find that outside directorships decrease a CEO’s managerial efficiency while host board capital reduces this effect.
Keywords: Agency theory, board capital theory, board of directors, CEO managerial efficiency, CEO outside directorships
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Mutlu, Canan and Mutlu, Sunay and Sauerwald, Steve, CEO Outside Directorships and Managerial Efficiency: The Role of Host Board Capital (July 2020). Corporate Governance: An International Review, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3670408
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