CEO Outside Directorships and Managerial Efficiency: The Role of Host Board Capital

Corporate Governance: An International Review, Forthcoming

Posted: 23 Sep 2020

See all articles by Canan Mutlu

Canan Mutlu

Kennesaw State University - Michael J. Coles College of Business

Sunay Mutlu

Kennesaw State University - Michael J. Coles College of Business

Steve Sauerwald

University of Illinois at Chicago

Date Written: July 2020

Abstract

We explore the value of CEO outside directorships on managerial efficiency by identifying a unique empirical setting where a CEO’s number of outside board seats is exogenously decreased by a merger that eliminates the board of a host firm the CEO is serving on. Using this event as our empirical instrument, we find that outside directorships decrease a CEO’s managerial efficiency while host board capital reduces this effect.

Keywords: Agency theory, board capital theory, board of directors, CEO managerial efficiency, CEO outside directorships

Suggested Citation

Mutlu, Canan and Mutlu, Sunay and Sauerwald, Steve, CEO Outside Directorships and Managerial Efficiency: The Role of Host Board Capital (July 2020). Corporate Governance: An International Review, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3670408

Canan Mutlu

Kennesaw State University - Michael J. Coles College of Business ( email )

1000 Chastain Road
Kennesaw, GA 30144
United States

Sunay Mutlu (Contact Author)

Kennesaw State University - Michael J. Coles College of Business ( email )

1000 Chastain Road
Kennesaw, GA 30144
United States

Steve Sauerwald

University of Illinois at Chicago

1200 W Harrison St
Chicago, IL 60607
United States

HOME PAGE: ssauerw@uic.edu

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