The Effects of Tax Avoidance News on Employee Perceptions of Managers and Firms: Evidence from Glassdoor.com Ratings

61 Pages Posted: 25 Sep 2020 Last revised: 2 Sep 2022

See all articles by Yoojin Lee

Yoojin Lee

California State University, Long Beach

Shaphan Ng

Singapore Management University - School of Accountancy

Terry J. Shevlin

University of California-Irvine; University of California-Irvine

Aruhn Venkat

McCombs School of Business, University of Texas at Austin; University of California, Irvine

Date Written: June 4, 2020

Abstract

We examine whether employee perceptions of managers and firms fall following tax avoidance news. Using S&P 500 firms and generalized difference-in-differences specifications, we find that tax avoidance news negatively affects employee perceptions of managers and firms. In cross-sectional tests, we find that (1) firms and managers in consumer-facing industries suffer larger employee-related perception changes from tax avoidance news compared to other firms, and (2) well-performing firms and their managers face smaller perception changes than other firms and managers. Overall, our results are consistent with tax avoidance news negatively affecting employee perceptions of managers and firms.

Keywords: Tax avoidance news, reputation, employee ratings, Glassdoor

Suggested Citation

Lee, Yoojin and Ng, Shaphan and Shevlin, Terry J. and Shevlin, Terry J. and Venkat, Aruhn, The Effects of Tax Avoidance News on Employee Perceptions of Managers and Firms: Evidence from Glassdoor.com Ratings (June 4, 2020). The Accounting Review, Forthcoming, Singapore Management University School of Accountancy Research Paper No. 2021-140, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3671004 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3671004

Yoojin Lee (Contact Author)

California State University, Long Beach ( email )

1250 Bellflower Blvd
Long Beach, CA 90064
United States

Shaphan Ng

Singapore Management University - School of Accountancy ( email )

60 Stamford Road
Singapore 178900
Singapore

Terry J. Shevlin

University of California-Irvine ( email )

Paul Merage School of Business
Irvine, CA California 92697-3125
United States
2065509891 (Phone)

University of California-Irvine ( email )

Paul Merage School of Business
Irvine, CA 92697-3125
United States
949-824-6149 (Phone)

Aruhn Venkat

McCombs School of Business, University of Texas at Austin ( email )

2110 Speedway
Austin, TX 78705
United States

University of California, Irvine ( email )

Irvine, CA
United States
9498246149 (Phone)
92697 (Fax)

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