Policies and Instruments for Self-Enforcing Treaties
49 Pages Posted: 13 Aug 2020
Date Written: 2020
Abstract
We characterize the optimal policy and policy instruments for self-enforcing treaties when
countries invest in green technology before they pollute. If the discount factor is too small to
support the first best, then both emissions and investments will be larger than in the first best,
when technology is expensive. When technology is inexpensive, countries must instead limit or
tax green investment in order to make future punishment credible. We also uncover a novel
advantage of price regulation over quantity regulation, namely that when regulation is sufficiently
flexible to permit firms to react to non-compliance in another country, the temptation to defect is
reduced. The model is tractable and allows for multiple extensions.
Keywords: climate change, environmental agreements, green technology, policy instruments, repeated games, compliance, self-enforcing treaties
JEL Classification: D860, F530, H870, Q540
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation