The Economics of Platforms: A Theory Guide for Competition Policy

43 Pages Posted: 13 Aug 2020

See all articles by Bruno Jullien

Bruno Jullien

University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Wilfried Sand-Zantman

University of Toulouse Capitole

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: 2020

Abstract

We propose an analysis of platform competition based on the academic literature with a view towards competition policy. First, we discuss to which extent competition can emerge in digital markets and show which forms it can take. In particular, we underline the role of dynamics, but also of platform differentiation, consumers multi-homing and beliefs to allow competition in platform markets. Second, we analyse competition policy issues and discuss how rules designed for standard markets can perform in two-sided markets. We show that multi-sided externalities create new opportunities for anti-competitive conducts, often related to pricing and contractual imperfections.

Keywords: networks, platforms, markets, competition policy

JEL Classification: L130, L410, L860, D820

Suggested Citation

Jullien, Bruno and Sand-Zantman, Wilfried, The Economics of Platforms: A Theory Guide for Competition Policy (2020). CESifo Working Paper No. 8463, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3671248 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3671248

Bruno Jullien (Contact Author)

University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) ( email )

Place Anatole-France
Toulouse Cedex, F-31042
France

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Wilfried Sand-Zantman

University of Toulouse Capitole ( email )

France

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