The Sustainability Wage Gap

63 Pages Posted: 11 Sep 2020 Last revised: 27 Jan 2024

See all articles by Philipp Krueger

Philipp Krueger

University of Geneva - Geneva Finance Research Institute (GFRI); Swiss Finance Institute; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); University of Geneva - Geneva School of Economics and Management

Daniel Metzger

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Rotterdam School of Management (RSM); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Financial Markets Group

Jiaxin Wu

Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Finance

Date Written: November 3, 2023

Abstract

Using administrative employer-employee matched data, we provide evidence that workers earn substantially lower wages in more sustainable firms. Examining both cross-sectional and time-series heterogeneity, we find that the wage gap is larger for high-skilled workers and increasing over time. We hypothesize that this Sustainability Wage Gap arises because workers with preferences for sustainability accept lower wages to work in more environmentally sustainable firms. Using a battery of additional tests, we argue that our results are difficult to reconcile with many alternative interpretations suggested in prior research such as a better work-life balance or better career opportunities.

Keywords: Wage differentials; Allocation of talent; Human capital; Sustainability; ESG; CSR; Preferences; Work-life balance; Career opportunities

JEL Classification: J24, J31, Q56, G32

Suggested Citation

Krueger, Philipp and Metzger, Daniel and Wu, Jiaxin, The Sustainability Wage Gap (November 3, 2023). Swedish House of Finance Research Paper No. 20-14, European Corporate Governance Institute – Finance Working Paper 718/2020, Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper No. 21-17, HKU Jockey Club Enterprise Sustainability Global Research Institute – Archive, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3672492 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3672492

Philipp Krueger

University of Geneva - Geneva Finance Research Institute (GFRI) ( email )

40 Boulevard du Pont d'Arve
Geneva 4, Geneva 1211
Switzerland

Swiss Finance Institute ( email )

Switzerland

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
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Belgium

University of Geneva - Geneva School of Economics and Management ( email )

Uni Mail
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Switzerland

Daniel Metzger (Contact Author)

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Rotterdam School of Management (RSM) ( email )

P.O. Box 1738
Room T08-21
3000 DR Rotterdam, 3000 DR
Netherlands

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Financial Markets Group ( email )

Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom

Jiaxin Wu

Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Finance ( email )

SE-113 83 Stockholm
Sweden

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