Federalism and Democracy in India and the European Union

Abstract

The article is part of the forthcoming volume 'Constitutional Democracy in the European Union and India: Comparing the Law of Demcoracy in Contintental Polities' (Elgar 2021, eds. P. Dann & A. Thiruvengadam). It compares constitutional structures and historical experiences of federalism and democracy in India and the EU along two guiding questions: What effect does the federal order have on constitutional democracy? And what is the ‘federal quality’ of central level decision-making, i.e. how are the subunits’ interests taken into account, when the centre acts?

The article argues that while federal democracy in the two polities was initially organized in two starkly different ways (strongly centralized in India, the opposite in the early EU), the federal order triggered profound democratic questions. These were then addressed in different and as such characteristic ways – through bottom-up, popular agitation and electoral federalism in India, and through executive federalism, top-down attempts of mobilization and a partial parliamentarization in the EU.

The chapter juxtaposes the two constitutional experiences, mindful of the historical starting points in both systems that continue to shape them and also looking at the transformations. It ends with observations on the effect of federal structures on democratic constitutionalism and current authoritarian challenges in both polities.

Keywords: India, European Union, federalism, electoral federalism, executive federalism, parliamentary democracy