Download This PaperAltruism and Envy in Contests: An Evolutionarily Stable Symbiosis
24 Pages Posted: 16 Jan 2003
Date Written: December 2002
Abstract
Altruists and envious people who meet in contests are symbionts. They do better than a population of narrowly rational individuals. If there are only altruists and envious individuals, a particular mixture of altruists and envious individuals is evolutionarily stable.
Keywords: Altruism, Envy, Contests, Evolutionary Stability
JEL Classification: C72, D64, D74
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Kai A. Konrad (Contact Author)
Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance ( email )
Marstallplatz 1
Munich, 80539
Germany
HOME PAGE: http://www.tax.mpg.de/en/pub/home.cfm
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)
Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, 81679
Germany
IZA Institute of Labor Economics
P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, 53072
Germany
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