Power, Scrutiny, and Congressmen's Favoritism for Friends' Firm
56 Pages Posted: 18 Aug 2020
Date Written: August 2020
Abstract
Does more political power always lead to more favoritism? The usual affirmative answer overlooks scrutiny's role in shaping the pattern of favoritism over the ladder of power. When attaining higher-powered positions under even stricter scrutiny, politicians may reduce quid-pro-quo favors towards connected firms to preserve their career prospect. Around close Congress elections, we find RDD-based evidence of this adverse effect that a politician's win reduces his former classmates' firms stock value by 2.8%. As predicted, this effect varies by cross-state scrutiny, politicians' power, firms' size and governance, and connection strength. It diminishes as a politician's career concern fades over time.
Keywords: close election, congressmen, favoritism, political connection, Power, RDD, scrutiny
JEL Classification: D72, D73, D85, G14, G32
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