Enforcement against Organized Crime Fosters Illegal Markets: Evidence from the Yakuza

37 Pages Posted: 2 Oct 2020

See all articles by Tetsuya Hoshino

Tetsuya Hoshino

ITAM

Takuma Kamada

Osaka University - Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP)

Date Written: August 17, 2020

Abstract

The Yakuza Exclusion Ordinances (YEOs) have been implemented at different times across prefectures in Japan, where it is not illegal to organize or join criminal organizations — the yakuza. The YEOs indirectly regulate on the yakuza by prohibiting non-yakuza citizens from providing any benefit to them. In Japan, organized fraud has been a serious issue, accounting for almost half of the total financial damage by all property crimes. Difference-in-differences estimates indicate that:

(i) the YEOs increase the revenue from organized fraud and

(ii) the YEOs’ effects are greater in regions with lower concentration levels of yakuza syndicates.

Additional evidence suggests that both current and former yakuza members engage in the fraud in the presence of the YEOs. One policy implication is that the rehabilitation assistance for former yakuza members can be effectively implemented in regions with lower concentration of yakuza syndicates.

Keywords: Enforcement; Organized Crime; Yakuza; Illegal Markets

JEL Classification: K14, K42

Suggested Citation

Hoshino, Tetsuya and Kamada, Takuma, Enforcement against Organized Crime Fosters Illegal Markets: Evidence from the Yakuza (August 17, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3675207 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3675207

Tetsuya Hoshino

ITAM ( email )

Camino a Santa Teresa No. 930
Col. Héroes de Padierna
Ciudad de México
Mexico

Takuma Kamada (Contact Author)

Osaka University - Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP) ( email )

1-31, Machikaneyama
Toyonaka, Osaka 560-0043
Japan

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