Political Booms and Currency Crises

26 Pages Posted: 14 Oct 2020 Last revised: 14 Apr 2021

See all articles by Can Sever

Can Sever

International Monetary Fund

Date Written: August 24, 2020

Abstract

Popularity-concerned governments may not have enough incentives to take decisive corrective actions to address underlying weaknesses in the economy, since such prudent policies, that would be optimal for the economy, may be politically costly in the short-term. This approach, in turn, can deteriorate economic fundamentals and increase related risks in the economy which can eventually lead to crises. I show evidence on this phenomenon in the case of currency crises. I find that political booms, defined as the rise in governments` popularity, are a good predictor of currency crises, suggesting that currency crises are often ``political booms gone bust'' events. However, higher international reserves, higher exports, and a higher degree of financial openness alleviate the effect of political booms on currency crises.

Keywords: Currency crises, early warning systems, government popularity, political booms, economic growth

JEL Classification: E44, F43, G01, N10, N20, O47

Suggested Citation

Sever, Can, Political Booms and Currency Crises (August 24, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3680158 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3680158

Can Sever (Contact Author)

International Monetary Fund ( email )

19th St NW
Washington DC, DC 20431
United States

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