Federal Terrorism Risk Insurance

Posted: 24 Mar 2003

See all articles by Jeffrey R. Brown

Jeffrey R. Brown

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign - Department of Finance; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); University of Illinois College of Law; University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign - Institute of Government and Public Affairs (IGPA); University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign - Department of Economics

Randall Kroszner

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Brian H. Jenn

Yale University - Law School

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Abstract

In the aftermath of terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, an important public policy question arose as to whether, and how, the federal government should intervene to provide a temporary backstop for property/casualty terrorism insurance. This paper examines several economic justifications for intervention and the rationale behind the Administration's proposal for a temporary and limited government program.

Suggested Citation

Brown, Jeffrey R. and Kroszner, Randall and Jenn, Brian H., Federal Terrorism Risk Insurance. National Tax Journal, Vol. 55, No. 3, September 2002, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=368168

Jeffrey R. Brown

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign - Department of Finance ( email )

1206 South Sixth Street
Champaign, IL 61820
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

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University of Illinois College of Law ( email )

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Champaign, IL 61820
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University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign - Institute of Government and Public Affairs (IGPA) ( email )

Urbana, IL 61801
United States

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign - Department of Economics ( email )

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Urbana, IL 61801
United States

Randall Kroszner

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )

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Chicago, IL 60637
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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
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Brian H. Jenn (Contact Author)

Yale University - Law School ( email )

P.O. Box 208215
New Haven, CT 06520-8215
United States

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