I Want You! An Experiment Studying the Selection Effect When Assigning Distributive Power

UFAE and IAE Working Paper No. 521.02

21 Pages Posted: 25 Mar 2003

See all articles by Jordi Brandts

Jordi Brandts

Instituto de Analisis Economico (CSIC) Barcelona

Werner Güth

Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods; Luiss Guido Carli University

Andreas Stiehler

Humboldt Universität zu Berlin

Date Written: May 15, 2002

Abstract

We study whether selection affects motivation. In our experiment subjects first answer a personality questionnaire. They then play a 3-person game. One of the three players decides between an outside option assigning him a positive amount, but leaving the two others empty-handed and allowing one of the other two players to distribute a pie. Treatments differ in the procedure by which distributive power is assigned: to a randomly determined or to a knowingly selected partner. Before making her decision the selecting player could consult the personality questionnaire of the other two players. Results show that knowingly selected players keep less for themselves than randomly selected ones and reward the selecting player more generously.

Keywords: organizational behavior, reciprocity, trust

JEL Classification: C92, J53, M12

Suggested Citation

Brandts, Jordi and Güth, Werner and Stiehler, Andreas, I Want You! An Experiment Studying the Selection Effect When Assigning Distributive Power (May 15, 2002). UFAE and IAE Working Paper No. 521.02, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=368241 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.368241

Jordi Brandts (Contact Author)

Instituto de Analisis Economico (CSIC) Barcelona ( email )

UAB Campus
E-08193 Bellaterra
Spain

Werner Güth

Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10
D-53113 Bonn, 53113
Germany

Luiss Guido Carli University ( email )

Via O. Tommasini 1
Rome, Roma 00100
Italy

Andreas Stiehler

Humboldt Universität zu Berlin ( email )

Unter den Linden 6
D-10178 Berlin, AK 10099
Germany
+49 30 2093 5720 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.wiwi.hu-berlin.de/staff/e/t3/andreas.stiehler

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