AI and Interdependent Pricing: Combination Without Conspiracy?

Competition: The Journal of the Antitrust, UCL and Privacy Section

Univ. of San Francisco Law Research Paper No. 2020-04

19 Pages Posted: 8 Sep 2020 Last revised: 12 Oct 2020

See all articles by Joshua P. Davis

Joshua P. Davis

University of San Francisco - School of Law

Anupama Reddy

Independent

Date Written: August 1, 2020

Abstract

Artificial Intelligence (AI) holds the potential to enhance the ability of competitors to coordinate prices without forming agreements. That could cause widespread market failures. Competitors in a broad range of industries could use AI to cause the same harms brought about horizontal price fixing without triggering legal liability. This Article suggests a solution to this potential problem: adopting the long-contemplated policy of imposing civil liability when competitors achieve supracompetitive prices regardless of whether they enter an agreement to do so.

Keywords: Artificial Intelligence (AI), Antitrust,Technology, Conspiracy, Price Fixing, Parallel Pricing

Suggested Citation

Davis, Josh Paul and Reddy, Anupama, AI and Interdependent Pricing: Combination Without Conspiracy? (August 1, 2020). Competition: The Journal of the Antitrust, UCL and Privacy Section, Univ. of San Francisco Law Research Paper No. 2020-04, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3682772

Josh Paul Davis (Contact Author)

University of San Francisco - School of Law ( email )

2130 Fulton Street
San Francisco, CA 94117
United States

Anupama Reddy

Independent

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