Augmenting the Value of Ownership by Protecting it Only Partially: The 'Market-Overt' Rule Revisited

42 Pages Posted: 14 Apr 2003  

Barak Medina

Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Faculty of Law

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Abstract

This paper analyzes alternative rules for settling conflicts between right owner and a bona-fide purchaser. The optimal rule, so it is argued, is the one which maximizes the expected value of the ownership right, given the risk of right-violation. In order to maximize this value, one must seek to both mitigate the risk of right-violation and augment a potential buyer's willingness-to-pay for the right. The analysis specifies the relevant parameters that define which rule is optimal in given circumstances, and proves that there are cases in which the value of the ownership right is maximized if the owner's right is only partially protected against innocent third parties. Two prevailing notions are challenged: First, that the "Market Overt" rule necessarily induces buyers to invest fewer resources in pre-purchase precautions; and second, that a buyer's willingness-to-pay is unaffected by the choice of the legal rule.

JEL Classification: K11

Suggested Citation

Medina, Barak, Augmenting the Value of Ownership by Protecting it Only Partially: The 'Market-Overt' Rule Revisited. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=368280 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.368280

Barak Medina (Contact Author)

Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Faculty of Law ( email )

Mount Scopus, 91905
Israel

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