State and Local Government Choices in Fiscal Redistribution

Posted: 3 Feb 2003

See all articles by Roy W. Bahl

Roy W. Bahl

Georgia State University - Andrew Young School of Policy Studies

Jorge Martinez-Vazquez

Georgia State University - Andrew Young School of Policy Studies

Sally Wallace

Georgia State University - Department of Economics; University of Pretoria

Abstract

Economics have devoted relatively little attention to explaining why some state and local governments choose more progressive fiscal instruments than others. This paper provides an empirical model to identify the determinants of income redistribution as a budgetary choice, and estimates the strength of these determinants with state-local government panel data for a 21 year period. We find emphasis on redistributive expenditures in less urbanized and poorer states, and more emphasis on redistributive revenues in states that are less urbanized, poorer, and with larger elderly and black populations. We find that state-local governments use revenue and expenditure distriubtion instruments as complements.

Suggested Citation

Bahl, Roy W. and Martinez-Vazquez, Jorge and Wallace, Sally, State and Local Government Choices in Fiscal Redistribution. National Tax Journal, Vol. 55, No. 4, December 2002. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=368360

Roy W. Bahl

Georgia State University - Andrew Young School of Policy Studies ( email )

P.O. Box 3992
Atlanta, GA 30302-3992
United States

Jorge Martinez-Vazquez (Contact Author)

Georgia State University - Andrew Young School of Policy Studies ( email )

University Plaza
PO Box 3992
Atlanta, GA 30302-3992
United States
404-651-3990 (Phone)
404-651-3996 (Fax)

Sally Wallace

Georgia State University - Department of Economics ( email )

Department of Economics
35 Broad Street, 6th Floor
Atlanta, GA 30303-3083
United States
(404) 413-0046 (Phone)

University of Pretoria ( email )

Physical Address Economic and Management Sciences
Pretoria, Gauteng 0002
South Africa

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
688
PlumX Metrics