MiFID II and the Unbundling of Analyst Research from Trading Execution

50 Pages Posted: 19 Oct 2020 Last revised: 18 Oct 2022

See all articles by Ben Lourie

Ben Lourie

University of California, Irvine

Devin M. Shanthikumar

University of California, Irvine - Paul Merage School of Business

Il Sun Yoo

University of California, Irvine

Date Written: July 8, 2022

Abstract

The revised Markets in Financial Instruments Directive, known as MiFID II, requires the unbundling of research payments from trading execution. Using a difference-in-differences research design, we examine whether this regulation impacted the research–trading relation. We find that MiFID II weakened the link between the brokerage share of trading and analyst research. Forecast frequency, optimism, and accuracy are less likely to be associated with the brokerage trading share after MiFID II. These results do not subside in the years following the implementation of the regulation. Analysts appear to respond to these changes. Following MiFID II, analysts in Europe are less likely than analysts in the US to continue high forecast frequency, optimism, and accuracy for stocks with high share importance for the analyst’s brokerage house. We find similar results throughout for recommendations. Overall, our evidence suggests that MiFID II is at least partially successful in unbundling research from execution.

Keywords: MiFID II, Regulation, Sell-Side Analysts, Brokerage Houses, Trading Volume, Commissions, Conflicts of Interest, Incentives, Earnings Forecasts

JEL Classification: G24, D82, M41, M52

Suggested Citation

Lourie, Ben and Shanthikumar, Devin M. and Yoo, Il Sun, MiFID II and the Unbundling of Analyst Research from Trading Execution (July 8, 2022). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3684134 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3684134

Ben Lourie (Contact Author)

University of California, Irvine ( email )

Irvine, CA 92697-3125
United States

Devin M. Shanthikumar

University of California, Irvine - Paul Merage School of Business ( email )

Paul Merage School of Business
SB2 428
Irvine, CA 92697-3125
United States

Il Sun Yoo

University of California, Irvine ( email )

Paul Merage School of Business
Irvine, CA 92697-3125
United States

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