A Justified Envy Minimal Variation of the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism

14 Pages Posted: 22 Oct 2020

See all articles by Jian Hong

Jian Hong

Shanghai University of Finance and Economics

Qianfeng Tang

Shanghai University of Finance and Economics - School of Economics

Date Written: July 28, 2020

Abstract

For priority-based allocation of indivisible objects to agents with unit demand, when each object has exactly one copy, Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2019) show that the priority-based top trading cycles mechanism is justified envy minimal, in the sense that no strategy proof and Pareto efficient mechanism has strictly less justified envy than it. It remains open whether there is a unique justified envy minimal mechanism. We propose a strategy proof and Pareto efficient variation of the top trading cycles mechanism and show that it is also justified envy minimal.

Keywords: Pareto Efficiency, School Choice, Stability, Strategy-Proofness, Top Trading Cycles Mechanism

JEL Classification: C78, D61, D78, I20

Suggested Citation

Hong, Jian and Tang, Qianfeng, A Justified Envy Minimal Variation of the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism (July 28, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3685785 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3685785

Jian Hong

Shanghai University of Finance and Economics ( email )

777 Guoding Road
Shanghai, AK Shanghai 200433
China

Qianfeng Tang (Contact Author)

Shanghai University of Finance and Economics - School of Economics ( email )

777 Guoding Road
Shanghai, 200433
China

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