Strategic Patenting: Evidence from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

65 Pages Posted: 13 Oct 2020

See all articles by Yun Hou

Yun Hou

National University of Singapore

Ivan P. L. Png

National University of Singapore (NUS)

Xi Xiong

New York University (NYU), Department of Economics

Date Written: September 4, 2020

Abstract

How should businesses adjust strategic patenting to changes in patent law? Theoretically, under particular conditions, if the legal protection of patents is stronger, incumbent businesses would reduce patenting. When the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit assumed jurisdiction over patent appeals, it strengthened the legal protection of patents. Importantly, the strengthening varied geographically by judicial circuit. Exploiting these changes as a natural experiment, we find that post-CAFC, patents were more valuable commercially but not technologically superior, businesses reduced patenting, and new entry fell. The reduction in patenting was more pronounced among continuations, larger businesses, and in less concentrated industries.

Keywords: strategic patents, entry, patent law

JEL Classification: O30, O34

Suggested Citation

Hou, Yun and Png, Ivan P. L. and Xiong, Xi, Strategic Patenting: Evidence from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (September 4, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3686318 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3686318

Yun Hou

National University of Singapore ( email )

Business Link 1, NUS
01-07, BIZ 2
Singapore, Singapore 117592
Singapore
117592 (Fax)

Ivan P. L. Png (Contact Author)

National University of Singapore (NUS) ( email )

Singapore, 117543
Singapore
+65 6516-6807 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/site/iplpng/

Xi Xiong

New York University (NYU), Department of Economics ( email )

New York, NY
United States

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