Legislative Informational Lobbying

64 Pages Posted: 16 Sep 2020 Last revised: 11 Jun 2021

See all articles by Arnaud Dellis

Arnaud Dellis

Universite du Quebec a Montreal

Date Written: June 10, 2021

Abstract

Whom should an interest group lobby in a legislature? I develop a model of informational lobbying in which a legislature must decide on the allocation of district-specific goods and projects. An interest group chooses to search and provide information on districts' valuations of the goods. The setting is one of distributive politics with an allocation of goods and projects that is endogeneous to the information provided by the interest group. I characterize the information search strategy of the interest group. I determine who gains and who loses from lobbying, identifying circumstances in which legislators would unanimously prefer to ban informational lobbying. I also identify two empirical and institutional implications. First, I establish a relationship between informational lobbying and legislative majority requirement. Second, I provide an informational rationale for friendly lobbying (that is, the interest group lobbying legislative allies).

Keywords: Lobbying, Information, Interest group, Persuasion, Legislature, Policy-making, Distributive politics, Majority requirement

JEL Classification: C72, D72, D78

Suggested Citation

Dellis, Arnaud, Legislative Informational Lobbying (June 10, 2021). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3686620 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3686620

Arnaud Dellis (Contact Author)

Universite du Quebec a Montreal ( email )

315 St. Catherine Street East
Montreal, Quebec H2X 3X2
Canada

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/site/arnauddellis/

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