Unpaired Kidney Exchange: Overcoming Double Coincidence of Wants Without Money

74 Pages Posted: 11 Sep 2020 Last revised: 14 May 2021

See all articles by Mohammad Akbarpour

Mohammad Akbarpour

Stanford University

Julien Combe

CREST - Ecole polytechnique

Yinghua He

University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Victor Hiller

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Robert Shimer

University of Chicago - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Olivier Tercieux

Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques (PSE)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: September 2020

Abstract

For an incompatible patient-donor pair, kidney exchanges often forbid receipt-before-donation (the patient receives a kidney before the donor donates) and donation-before-receipt, causing a double-coincidence-of-wants problem. Our proposed algorithm, the Unpaired kidney exchange algorithm, uses “memory” as a medium of exchange to eliminate these timing constraints. In a dynamic matching model, we prove that Unpaired delivers a waiting time of patients close to optimal and substantially shorter than currently utilized state-of-the-art algorithms. Using a rich administrative dataset from France, we show that Unpaired achieves a match rate of 57 percent and an average waiting time of 440 days. The (infeasible) optimal algorithm is only slightly better (58 percent and 425 days); state-of-the-art algorithms deliver less than 34 percent and more than 695 days. We draw similar conclusions from the simulations of two large U.S. platforms. Lastly, we propose a range of solutions that can address the potential practical concerns of Unpaired.

Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.

Suggested Citation

Akbarpour, Mohammad and Combe, Julien and He, Yinghua and Hiller, Victor and Shimer, Robert J. and Tercieux, Olivier, Unpaired Kidney Exchange: Overcoming Double Coincidence of Wants Without Money (September 2020). NBER Working Paper No. w27765, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3687921

Mohammad Akbarpour (Contact Author)

Stanford University ( email )

Julien Combe

CREST - Ecole polytechnique ( email )

Office 4082, CREST - Ecole polytechnique
5 Avenue Le Chatelier
Palaiseau, 91120
France

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/combeju

Yinghua He

University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) ( email )

21 allée de Brienne
Toulouse, 31015
France

Victor Hiller

affiliation not provided to SSRN

No Address Available

Robert J. Shimer

University of Chicago - Department of Economics ( email )

1126 East 59th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773-702-9015 (Phone)
773-702-8490 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://home.uchicago.edu/~shimer/

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Olivier Tercieux

Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques (PSE) ( email )

48, BD Jourdan
75014 Paris
France

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
0
Abstract Views
57
PlumX Metrics