Winners and Losers from Sovereign Debt Inflows

73 Pages Posted: 11 Sep 2020 Last revised: 18 Nov 2024

See all articles by Fernando Broner

Fernando Broner

CREI; Barcelona GSE; Universitat Pompeu Fabra; CEPR

Alberto Martin

Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Centre de Recerca en Economia Internacional (CREI); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Lorenzo Pandolfi

CSEF - University of Naples Federico II - Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF)

Tomas Williams

George Washington University; George Washington University - Elliott School of International Affairs (ESIA)

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Date Written: September 2020

Abstract

We study the transmission of sovereign debt inflow shocks on domestic firms. We exploit episodes of large sovereign debt inflows in six emerging countries that are due to the announcements of these countries' inclusion in two major local-currency sovereign debt indexes. We show that these episodes significantly reduce government bond yields and appreciate the domestic currency, and have heterogeneous stock market effects on domestic firms. Firms operating in tradable industries experience lower abnormal returns than firms in non-tradable industries. In addition, financial, government-related, and firms that rely more on external financing experience relatively higher abnormal returns. The effect on financial and government-related firms is stronger in countries that display larger reductions in government bond yields. The effect on tradable firms is stronger in countries where the domestic currency appreciates more. We provide a stylized model that rationalizes these results. Our findings shed novel light on the channels through which sovereign debt inflows affect firms in emerging economies.

Suggested Citation

Broner, Fernando and Martin, Alberto and Pandolfi, Lorenzo and Williams, Tomas, Winners and Losers from Sovereign Debt Inflows (September 2020). NBER Working Paper No. w27772, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3687927

Fernando Broner (Contact Author)

CREI ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
Barcelona, 08005
Spain
+34 93 542 2601 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.crei.cat/people/broner

Barcelona GSE

Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27
Barcelona, 08005
Spain
+34 93 542 2601 (Phone)

Universitat Pompeu Fabra ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
Barcelona, 08005
Spain
+34 93 542 2601 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.crei.cat/people/broner

CEPR ( email )

London
United Kingdom
+34 93 542 2601 (Phone)

Alberto Martin

Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Centre de Recerca en Economia Internacional (CREI) ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
Barcelona, 08005
Spain

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

Lorenzo Pandolfi

CSEF - University of Naples Federico II - Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF) ( email )

Via Cintia
Complesso Monte S. Angelo
Naples, Naples 80126
Italy

Tomas Williams

George Washington University ( email )

Monroe Hall, Suite 340
2115 G Street, NW
Washington, DC 20052
United States

HOME PAGE: http://tomas-williams.com/

George Washington University - Elliott School of International Affairs (ESIA) ( email )

2201 G Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20052
United States

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