Economic Science and Hedonic Damage Analysis in Light of Daubert v. Merrell Dow

22 Pages Posted: 17 Apr 1997  

Thomas R. Ireland

University of Missouri

Walter D. Johnson

University of Missouri

Paul C. Taylor

Consulting Economist

Date Written: April 1997

Abstract

The 1993 landmark United States Supreme Court decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow set out specific criteria for admission of expert testimony. A crucial question for economists raised by the decision is how damage analysis by economists might be impacted by theses new rules. To the extent that the courts have applied Daubert to decisions on the admissibility of economic testimony in the three years since Daubert, it has been almost exclusively in the area of "hedonic damages." In a number of cases, courts have ruled that "hedonic damage" testimony does not meet the requirements of the Daubert decision. Only one has contained even an inference of probable acceptance of "hedonic damages." This paper reviews the cases individually and examines the rationales by which the courts have denied admissibility to "hedonic damage" testimony in an attempt to garner insight into the potential impact of Daubert on testimony by economic experts.

JEL Classification: K40

Suggested Citation

Ireland, Thomas R. and Johnson, Walter D. and Taylor, Paul C., Economic Science and Hedonic Damage Analysis in Light of Daubert v. Merrell Dow (April 1997). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=36887 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.36887

Thomas R. Ireland (Contact Author)

University of Missouri ( email )

8001 Natural Bridge Road
St Louis, MO 63121
United States
314-516-5558 (Phone)
314-516-5352 (Fax)

Walter D. Johnson

University of Missouri ( email )

8001 Natural Bridge Road
St Louis, MO 63121
United States

Paul C. Taylor

Consulting Economist

907-455-6037 (Phone)
907-455-6067 (Fax)

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