Market Power and Patent Strategies: Evidence from Renaissance Venice

44 Pages Posted: 10 Sep 2020

See all articles by Stefano Comino

Stefano Comino

Università degli Studi di Udine

Alberto Galasso

University of Toronto - Strategic Management

Clara Graziano

Università degli Studi di Udine - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

Date Written: June 2020

Abstract

This paper exploits the introduction of the first regularized patent system, which appeared in the Venetian Republic in 1474, to examine the factors shaping inventors’ propensity to use a new form of intellectual property. We combine detailed information on craft guilds and patents in Renaissance Venice and show a negative association between patenting activity and guild statutory norms that strongly restricted entry and price competition. Our analysis shows that the heterogeneity in patenting activity documented by the industrial organization literature is not a special feature of modern technologies, but is rather a persistent phenomenon affected by market power.

Suggested Citation

Comino, Stefano and Galasso, Alberto and Graziano, Clara, Market Power and Patent Strategies: Evidence from Renaissance Venice (June 2020). The Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 68, Issue 2, pp. 226-269, 2020, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3689738 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/joie.12223

Stefano Comino (Contact Author)

Università degli Studi di Udine ( email )

Via Tarcisio Petracco, Palazzo antonini, 8
Udine, 33100
Italy

Alberto Galasso

University of Toronto - Strategic Management ( email )

Canada

Clara Graziano

Università degli Studi di Udine - Department of Economics ( email )

Via Tomadini 30
33100 Udine
Italy
+0432+249216 (Phone)
+0432+249229 (Fax)

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

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