Illiquidity and Higher Cumulants

Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper No. 20-80

Review of Financial Studies, Forthcoming

76 Pages Posted: 15 Sep 2020 Last revised: 16 Aug 2022

See all articles by Sergei Glebkin

Sergei Glebkin

INSEAD

Semyon Malamud

Ecole Polytechnique Federale de Lausanne; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Swiss Finance Institute

Alberto Teguia

Rice University, Jesse H. Jones Graduate School of Business, Students

Date Written: August 13, 2022

Abstract

We characterize the unique equilibrium in an economy populated by strategic CARA investors who trade multiple risky assets with arbitrarily distributed payoffs. We use our explicit solution to study the joint behavior of illiquidity of option contracts. Option bid-ask spreads are proportional to risk aversion and risk-neutral variances of option payoffs. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, spreads may decrease in risk aversion, physical variance, open interest, and increase after earnings announcements. All these predictions are confirmed empirically using a large panel dataset of US stock options.

Keywords: Price Impact, Higher Cumulants, Strategic Trading, Liquidity

JEL Classification: D21, G31, G32, G35, L11

Suggested Citation

Glebkin, Sergei and Malamud, Semyon and Teguia, Alberto, Illiquidity and Higher Cumulants (August 13, 2022). Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper No. 20-80, Review of Financial Studies, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3692589 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3692589

Sergei Glebkin

INSEAD ( email )

Boulevard de Constance
77305 Fontainebleau Cedex
France

Semyon Malamud (Contact Author)

Ecole Polytechnique Federale de Lausanne ( email )

Lausanne, 1015
Switzerland

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

Swiss Finance Institute

c/o University of Geneva
40, Bd du Pont-d'Arve
CH-1211 Geneva 4
Switzerland

Alberto Teguia

Rice University, Jesse H. Jones Graduate School of Business, Students ( email )

Houston, TX
United States

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