Analysis and Interventions in Large Network Games

33 Pages Posted: 4 Nov 2020

See all articles by Francesca Parise

Francesca Parise

Cornell University - Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering

Asuman E. Ozdaglar

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science

Date Written: September 14, 2020

Abstract

We review classic results and recent progress on equilibrium analysis, dynamics, and optimal interventions in network games with both continuous and discrete strategy sets. We study strategic interactions in deterministic networks as well as networks generated from a stochastic network formation model. For the former case, we review a unifying framework for analysis based on the theory of variational inequalities. For the latter case, we highlight how knowledge of the stochastic network formation model can be used by a central planner to design interventions for large networks in a computationally efficient manner when exact network data is not available.

Keywords: network games, best response dynamics and interventions, stochastic network formation models, variational inequalities, graphons, linear threshold model

Suggested Citation

Parise, Francesca and Ozdaglar, Asuman E., Analysis and Interventions in Large Network Games (September 14, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3692826 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3692826

Francesca Parise (Contact Author)

Cornell University - Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering

Ithaca, NY 14853
United States

Asuman E. Ozdaglar

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science ( email )

50 Memorial Drive
Cambridge, MA 02139-4307
United States
617-324-0058 (Phone)

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