Impacts of Revenue Sharing, Profit Sharing, and Transfer Pricing on Quality-Improving Investments

Abstract

We compare revenue sharing with different profit-sharing rules and constant transfer prices in a buyer-seller setting, in which the incompleteness of contracts causes decentralization costs. Our focus is on a situation where a manufacturing department or a supplier of an intermediate product can invest in a quality improvement of the final product and thereby increase customer demand. We analyze the willingness of the supplier to invest under a revenue-sharing rule, three profit-sharing rules, and a transfer-pricing scheme. Our analysis shows that the performance of sharing rules is likely to decrease when the sharing basis consists of less cost components. Remarkably, this is not true for the revenue-sharing rule. To the contrary, this less prominent scheme can be shown to maximize total profit under a variety of cost combinations.

Keywords: underinvestment-problem, transfer pricing, surplus-sharing rules, incentive-compatible profit allocation, revenue sharing

JEL Classification: M40, M46, L29