Fifty Shades of QE: Conflicts of Interest in Economic Research

61 Pages Posted: 28 Sep 2020 Last revised: 15 Oct 2020

See all articles by Brian Fabo

Brian Fabo

National Bank of Slovakia

Martina Jancokova

European Central Bank

Elisabeth Kempf

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Lubos Pastor

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Multiple version iconThere are 4 versions of this paper

Date Written: October 15, 2020

Abstract

Central banks sometimes evaluate their own policies. To assess the inherent conflict of interest, we compare the research findings of central bank researchers and academic economists regarding the macroeconomic effects of quantitative easing (QE). We find that central bank papers report larger effects of QE on output and inflation. Central bankers are also more likely to report significant effects of QE on output and to use more positive language in the abstract. Central bankers who report larger QE effects on output experience more favorable career outcomes. A survey of central banks reveals substantial involvement of bank management in research production.

Keywords: Conflict of Interest, Central Bank, Quantitative Easing, QE, Career Concerns

JEL Classification: A11, E52, E58, G28

Suggested Citation

Fabo, Brian and Jancokova, Martina and Kempf, Elisabeth and Pastor, Lubos, Fifty Shades of QE: Conflicts of Interest in Economic Research (October 15, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3693174 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3693174

Brian Fabo

National Bank of Slovakia ( email )

Imricha Karvasa 1
813 25 Bratislava
Slovakia

Martina Jancokova

European Central Bank ( email )

Sonnemannstrasse 22
Frankfurt am Main, 60314
Germany

Elisabeth Kempf

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )

5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.chicagobooth.edu/faculty/directory/k/elisabeth-kempf

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Lubos Pastor (Contact Author)

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )

5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773-834-4080 (Phone)
773-702-0458 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.ChicagoGSB.edu/fac/lubos.pastor/

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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