The Power to Protect: Household Bargaining and Female Condom Use

Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 2020-058/V

72 Pages Posted: 4 Nov 2020

See all articles by Rachel Cassidy

Rachel Cassidy

World Bank

Marije Groot Bruinderink

University of Amsterdam

Wendy Janssens

VU University Amsterdam - Department of Development Economics

Karlijn Morsink

University of Oxford

Date Written: September 1, 2020

Abstract

Women may face systematically greater benefits than men from adopting certain technologies. Yet women often hold lower bargaining power, meaning that men's preferences may constrain household adoption when decisions are joint. When low female bargaining power constrains adoption of the first-best technology, introducing a version of the technology that is second-best in terms of cost or effectiveness, but more acceptable to men, may increase adoption and welfare. This paper contributes the first explicit model and test of the trade-offs when introducing a second-best technology in such a setting. We conduct a field experiment introducing female condoms (which are less effective and more expensive than male condoms, but often preferred by men) in an area with high HIV prevalence. We observe an increase in the likelihood that women have sex and find strongest adoption of female condoms among women with lower bargaining power, who were previously having unprotected sex.

JEL Classification: C78, O33, C93, J16, I12

Suggested Citation

Cassidy, Rachel and Groot Bruinderink, Marije and Janssens, Wendy and Morsink, Karlijn, The Power to Protect: Household Bargaining and Female Condom Use (September 1, 2020). Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 2020-058/V, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3693224 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3693224

Rachel Cassidy (Contact Author)

World Bank ( email )

1818 H Street, NW
Washington, DC 20433
United States

Marije Groot Bruinderink

University of Amsterdam ( email )

Roetersstraat 11
Amsterdam, NE 1018 WB
Netherlands

Wendy Janssens

VU University Amsterdam - Department of Development Economics ( email )

Netherlands

Karlijn Morsink

University of Oxford ( email )

Mansfield Road
Oxford, Oxfordshire OX1 4AU
United Kingdom

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