Collusion as Environmental Protection - An Economic Assessment

27 Pages Posted: 4 Nov 2020

See all articles by Cento Veljanovski

Cento Veljanovski

Case Associates; Institute of Economic Affairs

Date Written: September 15, 2020

Abstract

This article looks at the relationship between the environment and competition law. It shows that cooperative agreements in industries where there are significant pollution or open access resources such as fisheries may improve economic welfare and the environment. However, except for cooperative agreements among users of open access resources, this is likely to be coincidental and facilitate collusion. The pros and cons of expanding Article 101(3) TFEU to take account of third-party and wider benefits are examined, and whether competition authorities should pursue environmental protection.

Keywords: Article 101TFEU, antitrust, cooperative agreements, cartel, environment, sustainability, pollution, fisheries, open-access resource

JEL Classification: K21, L13, L40, Q01

Suggested Citation

Veljanovski, Cento, Collusion as Environmental Protection - An Economic Assessment (September 15, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3693381 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3693381

Cento Veljanovski (Contact Author)

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