Overzealous Rule Makers

42 Pages Posted: 17 Sep 2020

See all articles by Stefano Barbieri

Stefano Barbieri

Tulane University - Department of Economics

Kai A. Konrad

Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Date Written: September 17, 2020

Abstract

Excessively tight and biased policy choices of rule makers can be explained as outcomes of competition among rule makers with over-lapping competencies and diverging perceptions about the optimal framework. Rule makers who have extreme rather than moderate preferences are more likely to take policy action and preempt others, even if their cost of action is very high. This can lead to actionism, excessive regulatory activity, and radical rule outcomes.

Keywords: rule-making competition, preemption, identity depen-dent externalities, extremism, regulatory thicket

JEL Classification: H11, K51

Suggested Citation

Barbieri, Stefano and Konrad, Kai A., Overzealous Rule Makers (September 17, 2020). Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance No. 2020-11, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3694373

Stefano Barbieri

Tulane University - Department of Economics ( email )

New Orleans, LA 70118
United States

Kai A. Konrad (Contact Author)

Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance ( email )

Marstallplatz 1
Munich, 80539
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.tax.mpg.de/en/pub/home.cfm

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

90-98 Goswell Road
London, EC1V 7RR
United Kingdom

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, 81679
Germany

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, 53072
Germany

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