Transparency Gloves for Grabbing Hands? Politics and (Mis)Governance
32 Pages Posted: 14 Jul 2003
Date Written: December 2002
Abstract
Employing the canonical political agency model, this Paper studies the incentives of the government to provide high-quality services by reducing corruption. Acting as a principal in a moral hazard framework, the public disciplines the incumbent by replacing him if the generated output is unsatisfactorily low. The implications of the model indicate the importance of transparency, of the media, and of political contestability for taming corruption. The existing empirical evidence is shown to broadly support these conclusions.
Keywords: Political corruption, transparency, democracy
JEL Classification: D72, D78
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)
Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)
Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany
HOME PAGE: http://www.cesifo.de
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