Information Revelation and Efficiency in Auctions

12 Pages Posted: 17 Jan 2003

See all articles by Anna Mikusheva

Anna Mikusheva

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics

Konstantin Sonin

University of Chicago - Harris School of Public Policy; Higher School of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Date Written: December 2002

Abstract

We study the impact of information revelation on efficiency in auctions. In a constrained-efficient mechanism, i.e. a mechanism that is efficient subject to the incentive-compatibility constraint, any additional information available to bidders increases the expected efficiency of the mechanism. This result cannot be extended to a more general setup: In a second-price sealed-bid auction, revelation of information might lead to efficiency losses.

Keywords: Auctions, information, allocative efficiency

JEL Classification: D40, D80

Suggested Citation

Mikusheva, Anna and Sonin, Konstantin, Information Revelation and Efficiency in Auctions (December 2002). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=369603

Anna Mikusheva (Contact Author)

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics ( email )

50 Memorial Drive
E52-391
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States

HOME PAGE: http://econ-www.mit.edu/faculty/amikushe

Konstantin Sonin

University of Chicago - Harris School of Public Policy ( email )

1155 East 60th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

Higher School of Economics ( email )

20 Myasnitskaya street
Moscow, 119017
Russia

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
22
Abstract Views
1,101
PlumX Metrics