Measuring Property Rights Institutions

50 Pages Posted: 21 Sep 2020 Last revised: 25 Jan 2025

See all articles by Simeon Djankov

Simeon Djankov

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE); Peterson Institute for International Economics

Edward L. Glaeser

Harvard University - Department of Economics; Brookings Institution; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Valeria Perotti

World Bank

Andrei Shleifer

Harvard University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Date Written: September 2020

Abstract

How do the different elements in the standard bundle of property rights – such as the right of possession or the right of transfer – differentially impact outcomes, such as urban development? This paper incorporates insecure property rights into a standard model of urban land prices and density, and makes predictions about investment in land and property, informality, and the efficiency of land use. Our empirical analysis links data on institutions related to land titling and transfer with multiple urban outcomes, from 190 countries. The evidence is generally consistent with the model’s predictions, and more broadly with the Demsetz’s (1967) approach to property rights institutions. Indeed, we document world-wide improvements in the quality of institutions facilitating property transfer over time.

Suggested Citation

Djankov, Simeon and Glaeser, Edward L. and Perotti, Valeria and Shleifer, Andrei, Measuring Property Rights Institutions (September 2020). NBER Working Paper No. w27839, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3696206

Simeon Djankov (Contact Author)

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) ( email )

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Peterson Institute for International Economics ( email )

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Edward L. Glaeser

Harvard University - Department of Economics ( email )

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Brookings Institution

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Valeria Perotti

World Bank ( email )

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Andrei Shleifer

Harvard University - Department of Economics ( email )

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