The Authoritarian Trade-off: A Synthetic Control Analysis of Development and Social Compliance in the Xinjiang Autonomous Region

43 Pages Posted: 11 Nov 2020 Last revised: 20 Jul 2021

See all articles by Linan Peng

Linan Peng

Depauw University - Department of Economics and Management

Justin T Callais

Texas Tech University, College of Agricultural Sciences and Natural Resources, Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics, Students; University of Louisiana at Lafayette - Department of Economics and Finance

Date Written: September 21, 2020

Abstract

The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) has recently experienced a series of policies sought to bring economic development, as well as intensive methods of social compliance. A unique leader—Chen Quanguo—along with the Communist Party of China (CPC), brought these changes in the XUAR in 2016. We use the synthetic control method to analyze the effect that these policies had on the region. We specifically examine three outcomes: GDP per capita, arrest rates, and spending on public security. Our findings suggest that Chen and the policies implemented had no significant effect on development, but these policies led to much higher rates of arrest and larger spending on public security.

Keywords: Xinjiang, regional development, China, Synthetic Control Method, religious persecution

JEL Classification: K38, K42, P37, R11

Suggested Citation

Peng, Linan and Callais, Justin, The Authoritarian Trade-off: A Synthetic Control Analysis of Development and Social Compliance in the Xinjiang Autonomous Region (September 21, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3696884 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3696884

Linan Peng

Depauw University - Department of Economics and Management ( email )

Greencastle, IN 46135
United States

Justin Callais (Contact Author)

Texas Tech University, College of Agricultural Sciences and Natural Resources, Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics, Students ( email )

Box 42132
Lubbock, TX 79409-2132
United States

University of Louisiana at Lafayette - Department of Economics and Finance ( email )

Lafayette, LA 70504
United States

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
80
Abstract Views
474
rank
414,911
PlumX Metrics