Anticipated Adjudication: An Analysis of the Judicialization of the US Administrative State
45 Pages Posted: 12 Nov 2020
Date Written: August 3, 2020
To preserve democratic accountability, the actions of federal agencies remain subject to review by elected officials in the legislative and executive branches. Yet given the vast scope and complexity of the modern federal government, elected officials cannot possibly intervene in all agency matters. This leaves the courts to evaluate agency actions. Given the increased influence of courts over agency decision-making, agencies have evolved to include features that are more judicialized. Leveraging novel data on personnel records, agency litigation, and policy-making from 1996 to 2016, we provide an original and systematic account of the courts’ influence on agency personnel and professionalization. We find that agencies become more judicialized with increased exposure to the courts. Our dynamic comparison of the rise and fall of the number of judge-like policymakers within agencies highlight agency responses to judicial oversight.
Keywords: administrative law judges, administrative judges, bureaucracy, courts, separation of powers, judicialization
JEL Classification: J45, J48
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation