Anticipated Adjudication: An Analysis of the Judicialization of the US Administrative State

45 Pages Posted: 12 Nov 2020

See all articles by Scott Limbocker

Scott Limbocker

Vanderbilt University

William G. Resh

University of Southern California- Sol Price School of Public Policy

Jennifer Selin

Vanderbilt University - Department of Political Science

Date Written: August 3, 2020

Abstract

To preserve democratic accountability, the actions of federal agencies remain subject to review by elected officials in the legislative and executive branches. Yet given the vast scope and complexity of the modern federal government, elected officials cannot possibly intervene in all agency matters. This leaves the courts to evaluate agency actions. Given the increased influence of courts over agency decision-making, agencies have evolved to include features that are more judicialized. Leveraging novel data on personnel records, agency litigation, and policy-making from 1996 to 2016, we provide an original and systematic account of the courts’ influence on agency personnel and professionalization. We find that agencies become more judicialized with increased exposure to the courts. Our dynamic comparison of the rise and fall of the number of judge-like policymakers within agencies highlight agency responses to judicial oversight.

Keywords: administrative law judges, administrative judges, bureaucracy, courts, separation of powers, judicialization

JEL Classification: J45, J48

Suggested Citation

Limbocker, Scott and Resh, William G. and Selin, Jennifer, Anticipated Adjudication: An Analysis of the Judicialization of the US Administrative State (August 3, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3697447 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3697447

Scott Limbocker

Vanderbilt University ( email )

2301 Vanderbilt Place
Nashville, TN 37240
United States

William G. Resh (Contact Author)

University of Southern California- Sol Price School of Public Policy ( email )

Los Angeles, CA 90089-0626
United States

HOME PAGE: http://priceschool.usc.edu/william-g-resh/

Jennifer Selin

Vanderbilt University - Department of Political Science ( email )

VU Station B #351817
Nashville, TN 37235-1817
United States

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