The Evolution of Morality

Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 2020-063/I

69 Pages Posted: 12 Nov 2020 Last revised: 27 Jul 2021

See all articles by Matthijs van Veelen

Matthijs van Veelen

University of Amsterdam - Amsterdam School of Economics (ASE); Tinbergen Institute

Aslihan Akdeniz

University of Amsterdam

Date Written: September 17, 2020

Abstract

A considerable share of the literature on the evolution of human co-
operation considers the question why we have not evolved to play the Nash
equilibrium in prisoners' dilemmas or public goods games. In order to un-
derstand human morality and pro-social behaviour, we suggest it would
actually be more informative to investigate why we have not evolved to
play the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in sequential games, such as
the ultimatum game and the trust game. The \rationally irrational" be-
havior that can evolve in such games gives a much better match with
actual human behaviour, including elements of morality such as honesty,
responsibility, and sincerity, as well as the more hostile aspects of human
nature, such as anger and vengefulness. The mechanism at work here is
commitment, which does not need population structure, nor does it need
interactions to be repeated. We argue that this shift in focus can not only
help explain why humans have evolved to know wrong from right, but also
why other animals, with similar population structures and similar rates
of repetition, have not evolved similar moral sentiments. The suggestion
that the evolutionary function of morality is to help us commit to oth-
erwise irrational behaviour stems from the work of Robert Frank (1987;
1988), which has played a surprisingly modest role in the scienti c debate
to date.

Keywords: Morality, pro-sociality, commitment, ultimatum game, trust game, insurance game, punishment

JEL Classification: C73

Suggested Citation

van Veelen, Matthijs and Akdeniz, Aslihan, The Evolution of Morality (September 17, 2020). Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 2020-063/I, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3697501 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3697501

Matthijs Van Veelen (Contact Author)

University of Amsterdam - Amsterdam School of Economics (ASE) ( email )

Roetersstraat 11
Amsterdam, North Holland 1018 WB
Netherlands

Tinbergen Institute ( email )

Gustav Mahlerplein 117
Amsterdam, 1082 MS
Netherlands

Aslihan Akdeniz

University of Amsterdam ( email )

Spui 21
Amsterdam, 1018 WB
Netherlands

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