The Development of Collateral Stripping by Distressed Borrowers

16 Capital Markets Law Journal 56 (2020)

26 Pages Posted: 23 Sep 2020 Last revised: 25 Oct 2021

Date Written: September 23, 2020


In the past decade, private equity sponsors have taken a more aggressive stance against creditors of their portfolio companies, the most recent iteration of which has come in the form of collateral stripping. Sponsors have been using creative lawyering to transfer valuable collateral out of the reach of creditors. This Article delves deeper into the issue by examining the contract terms and litigation claims raised by these transactions.

The lack of protective covenants and ease of manipulating EBITDA and asset valuations are key conditions that permit collateral stripping. Each of these conditions were present in the past decade, primarily due to the protracted expansionary stage of the credit cycle. Lenders, however, can protect themselves from collateral stripping by negotiating stricter covenants and tighter EBITDA definitions, as well as pursuing ex post litigation for fraudulent transfers, illegal distributions, and claims for breach of fiduciary duty.

Contractual opportunism and creative lawyering will almost certainly continue to pervade credit markets. This Article provides a roadmap of ways that lenders can protect themselves from opportunism during contracting and throughout the course of the loan. As this Article concludes, ex post litigation claims are often an inadequate remedy, so lenders should seek to tighten EBITDA definitions and broaden protective covenants—even if to do so requires other concessions—to avoid litigation.

Keywords: Collateral Stripping, Private Equity, Capital Markets, Distressed Debt, Fiduciary Duties, Covenants, Contractual Opportunism

Suggested Citation

Mengden, Mitchell, The Development of Collateral Stripping by Distressed Borrowers (September 23, 2020). 16 Capital Markets Law Journal 56 (2020), Available at SSRN:

Mitchell Mengden (Contact Author)

Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP ( email )

767 Fifth Avenue
New York, NY 10153
United States

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