Browse or Experience

45 Pages Posted: 13 Nov 2020 Last revised: 23 Feb 2021

See all articles by Z. Eddie Ning

Z. Eddie Ning

Cheung Kong Graduate School of Business

J. Miguel Villas-Boas

University of California, Berkeley

Date Written: February 20, 2021

Abstract

Consumers gain information about the evolving value of a product both prior to purchase and when owning a product. We consider a model where both these types of gaining information are possible. The information gained when owning the product may affect future product purchases. We characterize when the consumer chooses to purchase the product if the consumer does not own it, the expected interval of time between purchases, and the expected number of product purchases over time. We find that, keeping product duration fixed, the optimal fixed price is independent of the initial product valuation if that valuation is sufficiently low such that a consumer not owning the product does not purchase it immediately, and characterize how the price charged affects the consumer information gathering strategy. When the firm can also choose product duration and there are no costs of production, we find that the firm chooses an expected production duration that is infinitely small, and charges a flow price for the consumer to use the product. We also characterize how the extent of learning when owning and when not owning the product, the duration of the product, and the discount rate affect the optimal consumer and firm strategies.

Keywords: Repeated Purchases, Evolving Preferences, Information Acquisition, Consumer Search, Durable Goods Monopoly, Rental Pricing

Suggested Citation

Ning, Z. Eddie and Villas-Boas, J. Miguel, Browse or Experience (February 20, 2021). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3698399 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3698399

Z. Eddie Ning (Contact Author)

Cheung Kong Graduate School of Business ( email )

Oriental Plaza, Tower E3
One East Chang An Avenue
Beijing, 100738
China

HOME PAGE: http://www.eddiening.com

J. Miguel Villas-Boas

University of California, Berkeley ( email )

Haas School of Business
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States
510-642-1250 (Phone)
510-643-1420 (Fax)

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