The Economics of Law Enforcement: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from Corporate Takeover Law

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See all articles by Gishan Dissanaike

Gishan Dissanaike

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Wolfgang Drobetz

University of Hamburg

Paul P. Momtaz

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Anderson School of Management; University College London Center for Blockchain Technologies

Jörg Rocholl

ESMT European School of Management and Technology; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Date Written: September 24, 2020

Abstract

This paper examines the impact of takeover law enforcement on corporate acquisitions. We use the European Takeover Directive as a natural experiment, which harmonizes takeover law across countries, while leaving its enforcement to the discretion of individual countries. We exploit this heterogeneity in enforcement quality across countries in a difference-in-differences-in-differences model, while employing an overall inductive research approach, following Karpoff and Whittry’s (2018) recommendation. We find that acquirer returns increase in countries with improvements in takeover law, driven by better target selection and lower cost of financing. The increase in acquirer returns is lower in weak enforcement jurisdictions, which we identify by developing a novel Takeover Law Enforcement Index (TLEI). The findings show that takeover law can mitigate agency conflicts, but its true value depends on its enforcement. Our results are robust to a number of robustness tests.

Keywords: Mergers and acquisitions, acquirer returns, law and finance, takeover law, law enforcement

JEL Classification: G30, G34, G38, K20, K22

Suggested Citation

Dissanaike, Gishan and Drobetz, Wolfgang and Momtaz, Paul P. and Rocholl, Joerg, The Economics of Law Enforcement: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from Corporate Takeover Law (September 24, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=

Gishan Dissanaike

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Wolfgang Drobetz

University of Hamburg ( email )

Moorweidenstrasse 18
Hamburg, 20148
Germany

Paul P. Momtaz (Contact Author)

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Anderson School of Management ( email )

110 Westwood Plaza
Los Angeles, CA 90095-1481
United States

University College London Center for Blockchain Technologies ( email )

UCL CBT UCL Computer Science
Malet Place London WC
London, London
United Kingdom

Joerg Rocholl

ESMT European School of Management and Technology ( email )

Schlossplatz 1
Berlin
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.esmt.org/en/159244

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

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