Pay for Performance, Partnership Success, and the Internal Organization of Venture Capital Firms

52 Pages Posted: 24 Nov 2020 Last revised: 15 Mar 2022

See all articles by Karan Bhanot

Karan Bhanot

University of Texas at San Antonio - Department of Finance

Date Written: September 20, 2020

Abstract

We show how the structure of partner incentives and the decision processes within a venture capital firm contribute to fund performance, partner retention and partnership success. Optimal capital allocation during staged financing requires that partner incentives encourage cooperation by linking a partner’s compensation to the return on the entire fund rather than return on the investment sponsored by an individual partner. Incentives for individual performance of senior partners are optimally provisioned by a higher profit share in a subsequent fund. For junior partners with lower profit shares, partner pay may be linked to performance of current individually sponsored deals. Our paper provides an economic underpinning to empirical observations about the internal organization of venture capital firms.

Keywords: Venture Capital, Internal Organization

JEL Classification: G23, G24

Suggested Citation

Bhanot, Karan, Pay for Performance, Partnership Success, and the Internal Organization of Venture Capital Firms (September 20, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3699555 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3699555

Karan Bhanot (Contact Author)

University of Texas at San Antonio - Department of Finance ( email )

San Antonio, TX 78249
United States
210-458-7429 (Phone)
210-458-5837 (Fax)

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