Law as Standing

Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Law (Leslie Green & Brian Leiter eds., vol. 4, forthcoming 2021)

23 Pages Posted: 16 Nov 2020 Last revised: 26 Jan 2021

See all articles by Avihay Dorfman

Avihay Dorfman

Tel Aviv University - Buchmann Faculty of Law

Alon Harel

Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Faculty of Law

Date Written: July 29, 2020

Abstract

This article addresses a basic question of general jurisprudence, namely, what difference law makes in moral space. It argues that the difference at issue does not necessarily come to telling us what morality (or justice) might dictate but rather to establishing a way of attributing decisions to all of us and not to any one of us in particular. This also means that law’s distinctive moral virtue is not justice but legitimacy. What renders this possible is the emergence of public officials whose value lies in being public officials. In that, the article defends the standing conception of law, according to which law’s most basic moral contribution is that of establishing an entity whose normative pronouncements could count as made in the name of (or even by) the polity.

Suggested Citation

Dorfman, Avihay and Harel, Alon, Law as Standing (July 29, 2020). Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Law (Leslie Green & Brian Leiter eds., vol. 4, forthcoming 2021), Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3700509 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3700509

Avihay Dorfman (Contact Author)

Tel Aviv University - Buchmann Faculty of Law ( email )

Ramat Aviv
Tel Aviv, 69978
Israel

Alon Harel

Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Faculty of Law ( email )

Mount Scopus
Mount Scopus, IL 91905
Israel
97 22 588 2582 (Phone)
97 22 582 3042 (Fax)

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