Hidden in Plain Sight: The Role of Corporate Board of Directors in Public Charity Lobbying

67 Pages Posted: 29 Sep 2020 Last revised: 27 Mar 2021

See all articles by Changhyun Ahn

Changhyun Ahn

University of Florida - Department of Finance, Insurance and Real Estate

Joel F. Houston

University of Florida - Department of Finance, Insurance and Real Estate

Sehoon Kim

University of Florida - Department of Finance, Insurance and Real Estate

Date Written: March 26, 2021

Abstract

We show that public charities with corporate directors on their boards spend more on lobbying for connected firms' industry interests. The effects of board connections are stronger when firms have greater lobbying expenditures themselves or when charities are constrained on funding. We rule out spurious factors with firm-charity pair fixed effects, and address reverse causality concerns using director turnovers as shocks to connections. Consistent with quid-pro-quo relationships, we find that connected firms benefit from increased procurement contracts, and that connected charities receive more grants and donations. Our results highlight executive charitable engagement as a complementary avenue for corporate political activities.

Keywords: Corporate Political Activities, Corporate Social Responsibility, Board of Directors, Political Connections, Lobbying, Public Charities, Nonprofit Organizations

JEL Classification: D72, G34, G38, P16

Suggested Citation

Ahn, Changhyun and Houston, Joel F. and Kim, Sehoon, Hidden in Plain Sight: The Role of Corporate Board of Directors in Public Charity Lobbying (March 26, 2021). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3700649 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3700649

Changhyun Ahn

University of Florida - Department of Finance, Insurance and Real Estate ( email )

P.O. Box 117168
Gainesville, FL 32611
United States

Joel F. Houston

University of Florida - Department of Finance, Insurance and Real Estate ( email )

P.O. Box 117168
Gainesville, FL 32611
United States

Sehoon Kim (Contact Author)

University of Florida - Department of Finance, Insurance and Real Estate ( email )

P.O. Box 117168
Gainesville, FL 32611
United States

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
149
Abstract Views
1,024
rank
243,796
PlumX Metrics