The Role of Antitrust Authorities Regarding the Digital Economy

27 Pages Posted: 6 Oct 2020 Last revised: 10 Dec 2020

See all articles by Gerhard Fussenegger

Gerhard Fussenegger

bpv Hügel Rechtsanwälte GmbH

Viktoria H.S.E. Robertson

Vienna University of Economics and Business; University of Graz

Date Written: September 28, 2020

Abstract

The advent of the digital era has not only had a profound impact on markets, but also on those areas of the law that relate to these markets – amongst them: competition law. This Austrian report on the role of antitrust authorities regarding the digital economy addresses the manifold ways in which the Austrian legislator, the Austrian (Supreme) Cartel Court and the Austrian Federal Competition Authority have dealt with digital markets in the recent past and what developments may lie in store for digital markets in the near future. Preceding the actual report, some introductory remarks embed the Austrian experience within a broader picture, highlighting some emerging trends in the application of competition law to digital markets.

Keywords: Antitrust enforcement, competition law, data, data protection, digital markets, digital reports, national competition authorities, new competition tools

Suggested Citation

Fussenegger, Gerhard and Robertson, Viktoria H.S.E., The Role of Antitrust Authorities Regarding the Digital Economy (September 28, 2020). Graz Law Working Paper No 02-2020, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3701206 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3701206

Gerhard Fussenegger

bpv Hügel Rechtsanwälte GmbH

Donau-City-Straße 11
Vienna, 1220
Austria

Viktoria H.S.E. Robertson (Contact Author)

Vienna University of Economics and Business ( email )

Welthandelsplatz 1
Vienna, Wien 1020
Austria

HOME PAGE: http://www.wu.ac.at/en/complaw/

University of Graz ( email )

Universitätsstraße 15/C4
Graz, 8010
Austria

HOME PAGE: http://unternehmensrecht.uni-graz.at/de/institut/mitarbeiterinnen/robertson/

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