The Dark Side of Investor Conferences: Evidence of Managerial Opportunism

The Accounting Review, forthcoming

63 Pages Posted: 17 Nov 2020 Last revised: 7 Oct 2022

See all articles by Brian J. Bushee

Brian J. Bushee

University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School

Daniel J. Taylor

The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania

Christina Zhu

University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School

Date Written: September 20, 2022

Abstract

While the shareholder benefits of investor conferences are well-documented, evidence on whether these conferences facilitate managerial opportunism is scarce. We examine whether managers opportunistically exploit heightened attention around the conference to “hype” the stock. We find that (1) managers increase the quantity of voluntary disclosure leading up to the conference; (2) these disclosures are more positive in tone and increase prices to a greater extent than post-conference disclosures; and (3) these disclosures are more pronounced when insiders sell their shares immediately prior to the conference. In circumstances where pre-conference disclosures coincide with pre-conference insider net selling, we find evidence of a significant return reversal––large positive returns before the conference and large negative returns after the conference––and that the firm is more likely to be named in a securities class action lawsuit. Collectively, our findings are consistent with some managers hyping the stock prior to the conference.

Keywords: Investor conferences, voluntary disclosure, private information, insider trading, opportunism

JEL Classification: G34, J33, K31, M52

Suggested Citation

Bushee, Brian J. and Taylor, Daniel and Zhu, Christina, The Dark Side of Investor Conferences: Evidence of Managerial Opportunism (September 20, 2022). The Accounting Review, forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3701977 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3701977

Brian J. Bushee

University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School ( email )

3641 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6365
United States
215-898-4872 (Phone)
215-573-2054 (Fax)

Daniel Taylor

The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania ( email )

3641 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6365
United States

Christina Zhu (Contact Author)

University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School ( email )

3641 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6365
United States

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