Liberty, Security, and Accountability: The Rise and Fall of Illiberal Democracies

60 Pages Posted: 5 Oct 2020 Last revised: 21 Oct 2020

See all articles by Gabriele Gratton

Gabriele Gratton

UNSW Australia Business School, School of Economics

Barton E. Lee

UNSW, Australia

Date Written: October 3, 2020

Abstract

We study a model of the rise and fall of illiberal democracies. Voters value both liberty and economic security. In times of crisis, voters may prefer to elect an illiberal government that, by violating constitutional constraints, offers greater economic security but less liberty. However, violating these constraints allows the government to manipulate information, in turn reducing electoral accountability. We show how elements of liberal constitutions induce voters to elect illiberal governments that remain in power for inefficiently long—including forever. We derive insights into what makes constitutions stable against the rise of illiberal governments. We extend the model to allow for illiberal governments to overcome checks and balances and become autocracies. We show that stronger checks and balances are a double-edged sword: they slow down autocratization but may make it more likely. We discuss the empirical relevance of our theoretical framework and its connection to real world examples.

Suggested Citation

Gratton, Gabriele and Lee, Barton E., Liberty, Security, and Accountability: The Rise and Fall of Illiberal Democracies (October 3, 2020). UNSW Economics Working Paper 2020-13a, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3704156 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3704156

Gabriele Gratton

UNSW Australia Business School, School of Economics ( email )

High Street
Sydney, NSW 2052
Australia

Barton E. Lee (Contact Author)

UNSW, Australia ( email )

High Street
Sydney, NSW 2052
Australia

HOME PAGE: http://www.bartonelee.com

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