Antitrust Economics and Consumer Protection Economics in Policy and Litigation: Why the Disparity?

10 Pages Posted: 6 Oct 2020

See all articles by Lawrence J. White

Lawrence J. White

Stern School of Business, New York University; New York University (NYU) - Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics

Date Written: October 2020

Abstract

The lag in the use of microeconomics in consumer protection policy and litigation—as compared with the use of microeconomics in antitrust/competition policy and litigation—has at least three causes: a considerably shorter period of intellectual development; the specific historical origins and culture of the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC), where this disparity is especially noticeable; and the splintering of consumer protection responsibilities across a very large number of federal and state agencies. This paper will expand on these themes and discuss their implications—including the opportunities for expanded research in the area of consumer protection economics.

JEL Classification: B12, B13, B21, D18, L41

Suggested Citation

White, Lawrence J. and White, Lawrence J., Antitrust Economics and Consumer Protection Economics in Policy and Litigation: Why the Disparity? (October 2020). Economic Inquiry, Vol. 58, Issue 4, pp. 1555-1564, 2020, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3704402 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ecin.12869

Lawrence J. White (Contact Author)

New York University (NYU) - Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics ( email )

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